The November Elections
And the Politics of Deracialization by McCormick, Joseph P., 2nd
New Directions
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 6
1-1-1990
The November Elections And the Politics of
Deracialization
Joseph P. McCormick 2nd
Follow this and additional works at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Howard @ Howard University. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Directions by
an authorized administrator of Digital Howard @ Howard University. For more information, please contact lopez.matthews@howard.edu.
Recommended Citation
McCormick, Joseph P. 2nd (1990) "The November Elections And the Politics of Deracialization," New Directions: Vol. 17: Iss. 1,
Article 6.
Available at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol17/iss1/6
NATIONAL
L. Douglas Wilder
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1990
The November Elections 
And the Politics of 
Deracialization
By Joseph P. McCormick, 2nd
T he election results of Tuesday, November 7, 1989, with the victor­ies by African American candidates 
in a variety of settings, have led political 
pundits and other would-be analysts to 
offer a variety of opinions on what has 
been the impact of one of the most in­
fluential features in American electoral 
politics, the role of race. This article 
examines the elections where African 
Americans captured the chief executive’s 
post, in both large cities and in the state 
of Virginia, discusses some of the more 
salient features of these victories, and 
then describes a pragmatic political 
strategy that may help to explain why 
these Blacks won.
The Dinkins and Wilder Campaigns
Much of the media attention has been 
focused on the victories of David Dinkins 
(’50 graduate of Howard’s College of Lib­
eral Arts) as mayor of New York City and 
L. Douglas Wilder (’59 graduate of 
Howard’s School of Law) as governor of 
Virginia. The outcomes of these contests 
represent “firsts” for the city of New 
York and for the state of Virginia. In both 
of these contests Wilder and Dinkins 
faced white opponents in electorates 
where whites constituted the majority of 
the registered voters. Both won by mar­
gins considerably less than had been pre­
dicted weeks before the November 7th 
election (Dinkins by about three percent 
and Wilder by less than one percent).1
Given the makeup of their respective 
electorates, Wilder and Dinkins crafted 
campaigns designed to generate support 
from African Americans as well as white 
voters. Interestingly, in both Virginia and 
New York City, the victors gained major­
ity support from those who were pro- 
choice on the volatile abortion issue. 
Dinkins purportedly got 58 percent of his 
votes from those New Yorkers who were
Experience as an elected 
official is an asset in any 
electoral contest. It is that 
much more of an asset for 
an African American can­
didate . . .
pro-choice. He also gathered in about 30 
percent of the white vote.2 Wilder, on 
the other hand, gained 40 to 43 percent 
of the white vote. This is in a state where 
whites make up about 80 percent of the 
general population. African Americans 
represent about 18 percent of the popu­
lation.3 Wilder forged a bi-racial coalition 
of African Americans (from throughout 
the state) and young white voters (large­
ly from northern Virginia) to win. One 
journalistic account of Wilder’s victory 
pointed out:
“Although Wilder made a special effort 
. . .  to energize the black vote, he did so 
with a message about statewide political 
and economic progress—one that was 
appealing to white voters as well. By 
fashioning a political message that tran­
scended racial lines, Wilder left unan­
swered questions about any special goals 
he may have to help black Virginians.”4
As was the case with Wilder, the com­
position of New York’s electorate forced 
Dinkins to weld together a multi-racial 
coalition by advancing a racially transcen­
dent message. Evidence of the apparent 
appeal of this sort of message can be
seen in some of the other contests 
around the nation where African Ameri­
can candidates won on November 7th.
Victories in Large Cities
As of January, 1988 about 60 percent of 
the 6,793 African Americans who held 
office in the United States were at either 
the county or city levels.5 Given this dis­
tribution, there were undoubtedly a 
number of victories on November 7th 
where African American incumbents re­
tained their offices while others were 
elected to office for the first time. Here 
the discussion focuses on the larger 
cities (population >100,000) where Afri­
can Americans were elected or re­
elected as mayors. The composition of 
the electorate, in most of these cities, 
forced many of the victors to take up a 
racially transcendent message that pro­
duced the multi-racial coalition needed to 
win.
The most noticeable characteristic 
shared by the African Americans who 
won office in seven of the largest cities 
(including New York) is that all had pre­
viously held an elective office (see Table 
1.). Of these seven, two were incumbent 
mayors (Carrie Perry in Hartford and 
Coleman Young in Detroit). Two pre­
viously held office as state senators 
(Mike White in Cleveland and John 
Daniels in New Haven). Two held office 
as city councilmen (Chester Jenkins in 
Durham and Norman Rice in Seattle). 
The seventh, (David Dinkins in New 
York) had been Manhattan borough 
president.
Experience as an elected official is an 
asset in any electoral contest. It is that 
much more of an asset for an African 
American candidate who seeks to run for 
office. The 1984 and 1988 presidential 
campaigns of Jesse Jackson clearly re­
vealed how a candidate may be con­
fronted with the “insufficient experience”
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challenge from would-be detractors.
The mayoral elections in Cleveland 
and Detroit shared two characteristics 
that separated them from the other five 
large cities where African Americans 
won. First, both Cleveland and Detroit 
are cities where African Americans make 
up at least half of the eligible voters. Sec­
ond, in both of these contests, the vic­
tors faced other African American 
opponents. Coleman Young, the four- 
term incumbent mayor of Detroit, de­
feated accountant Thomas Barrow. 
Young is reported to have won about 
two-thirds of the African American vote 
and 15 to 35 percent of the white vote in 
a city where African Americans comprise 
more than 60 percent of the total popu­
lation.6 The power of incumbency (and 
the attendant experience) along with the 
size of the Black electorate in Detroit es­
sentially meant that Young did not have 
to be as concerned in appealing to whites 
as was the case for Blacks who sought to 
win in many of these other large cities.
In Cleveland, State Senator Mike 
White defeated former City Councilman 
Chair George Forbes. Forbes, a 26-year 
veteran of Cleveland’s City Council and 
its turbulent history of racially divisive 
politics, was unable to make much of an 
appeal to the city’s white electorate. This 
is not at all surprising given Forbes’ com­
bative style which throughout his public 
career in Cleveland had frequently put 
him at loggerheads with white politi­
cians, both Democrat and Republican.7 
While Cleveland is perhaps the most 
racially polarized large city, Mike White 
was able to gain enough support to win. 
Ironically, in Cleveland, where racial bloc 
voting in local elections has been the 
norm for the past 25 years, the white 
electorate found itself in a situation very 
familiar to African Americans—the 
choice of a “lesser of two evils”: the 
younger state senator who made a con­
certed effort to appeal to white voters 
versus the older more combative veteran 
politician who apparently hoped that Afri­
can Americans support alone would be 
sufficient to win.
In the other five cities, each candidate 
faced a white opponent (see: Table 1). In 
four of these cities—Hartford, New 
Haven, New York, and Seattle—African 
Americans make up less than half of the 
electorate.8 Of these four cities, in only 
one, Hartford, was there an African 
American incumbent. Mayor Carrie
Perry retained office by gathering about 
70 percent of the vote. Of these four 
cities, Mayor Carrie Perry’s margin of 
victory was the widest. Given its size as 
a part of the total population in 1980 
(see: Table 1), the African American 
population of Hartford, in 1989, is prob­
ably approaching 50 percent. This would 
lead one to speculate that Perry’s cam­
paign strategy' depended less on support 
from white voters than was perhaps the 
case in either New Haven, New York or 
Seattle.
Table 1.
Selected Data for Cities (>100,000 pop.) 
Where African Americans Won or Re­
tained the Office of Mayor (Nov. 7,1989)
City & Name 
Winner*
Percent 
votes won
Race of 
Opponent
Percent African 
Americans 
(1980 census)
1. C le v e la n d ,  O H
(Mike White)**
55% Black 43.8
2. D e tro it ,  M l
(Coleman Ybung)**
56.4 Black 63.1
3. D u r h a m , N C
(Chester Jenkins)**
53 White 47.1
4. H a r t fo rd , CT
(Carrie Perry)***
74.3 White 33.9
5. N e w  H a v e n , CT
(John Daniels)**
70 White 31.9
6. N e w  Y o rk , N Y
(David Dinkins)**
51 White 25.2
7. S e a t t le ,  W A 58 White 9.5
(Norman Rice)**
Sources: These data were compiled from a variety of print 
media sources within two days of these elections. Sub­
sequent data analysis may yield percentage differences 
slightly different from those reported here. The data 
reported on the racial composition of the cities is the 
most recently available from the U.S. Census Bureau.
*: Incumbent mayor Richard Dixon was re-elected in 
Dayton, Ohio. No data on the margin of victory were 
available at the time this paper was written.
* * :  Winner previously held elected office other than that of 
mayor.
* * * :  Winner was the incumbent.
A bi-racial coalition was responsible 
for the victory of two-term Councilman 
Chester Jenkins in Durham, N.C. In the 
aftermath of his win, Jenkins told the 
press: “Black candidates can no longer 
be perceived only as the candidates that 
are interested in the social side of the 
equation. We need also to stress to the 
voters that we can handle fiscal responsi­
bilities . . .  We must be able to address 
the pocketbook issues as well as the non- 
pocketbook issues.”9 Jenkins’ winning 
effort brought together a coalition that 
included labor, white liberals and envi­
ronmentalists to defeat a Republican can­
didate allied with conservative Senator 
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.).10
The contest in Seattle is one where 
victorious Norman Rice had little choice 
but to forge a message that would have 
significant appeal to a predominately 
white electorate. African Americans 
make up only 10 percent of the elec­
torate in Seattle. Rice, a three-term city 
councilman, is said to have opposed a di­
visive referendum on the busing issue 
that was on the ballot at the same time. 
Given the racial divisions that have been 
seen across the country on the busing 
issue and the racial composition of the 
electorate that he faced, it is not at all 
surprising that Rice did not endorse 
school busing. Rice’s margin of victory 
was greater than in four large cities 
where African Americans make up 25 
percent or more of their respective elec­
torates (see: Table 1).
The Political Strategy of Deracialization
In the aftermath of these victories on 
November 7, 1989, students of Ameri­
can electoral politics have asked whether 
there is any underlying issue or theme 
that runs through all these contests 
where African Americans were success­
ful. Given the variety of socio-economic 
and demographic conditions that can be 
found from Seattle to New York City, one 
is hesitant to say that there is any signifi­
cant tie that binds the outcomes of these 
contests. Yet the available data on what is 
known of the sort of issues discussed by 
the candidates suggest consideration of 
an explanation that links the outcomes of 
most of the contests. This explanation 
rests on the compelling logic of the politi­
cal strategy of deracialization.
In the spring of 1976, political scientist 
Charles Hamilton wrote a paper on what 
he then perceived to be the approach the 
national Democratic Party’s platform 
should take toward issues of vital impor­
tance to African Americans in the 1976 
presidential campaign. The paper fo­
cused on domestic policy issues. In a 
subsequent effort to clarify his position, 
Hamilton urged that a deracialized politi­
cal strategy was one in which the Demo­
cratic presidential candidate would seek 
to emphasize those issues that would 
have an appeal to broad segments of the 
electorate across racial lines.11 As such, 
calls for government to play a positive 
role in the co-provision of decent paying 
jobs and affordable health care, so Hamil­
ton reasoned, were positions that a 
Democratic presidential candidate could
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In New York and Virginia, 
Dinkins and Wilder took a 
pro-choice stance on the 
abortion issue. This . . . 
gained support for both 
. . . from women and pro- 
choice activists.
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take (in 1976) that would have an appeal 
to whites as well as African Americans.
The essence of this political strategy is 
that its proponents would seek to deem- 
phasize those issues that may be viewed 
in explicitly racial terms, e.g., minority 
set-asides, affirmative action, or the 
plight of the urban underclass, while em­
phasizing those issues that appear to 
transcend the racial question; relevant 
examples in 1989: abortion; the fiscal 
health of the city or state; lower taxes or 
at least the promise not to introduce 
“new” taxes.
Hamilton further pointed out that 
there were at least three assumptions 
about the nature of American electoral 
politics that were connected with this 
political strategy:
(1) Political participants are willing to 
act pragmatically and understand that 
electoral gains, if made, were likely to be 
incremental.
This first assumption appears to sug­
gest that a candidate running for office, 
may not win the first time, but that the 
election may move the candidate in the 
direction of eventual victory, given the 
visibility and experience that the contest 
will provide. In all of the cities where 
non-incumbents won, only in Cleveland, 
with a historic victory by Carl Stokes in 
1967, had an African American candidate 
previously been successful.12
(2) Political participants understand 
that the ability to reward and punish is the 
fundamental basis of political power.
This assumption suggests that those 
who win electoral contests can ill afford 
to ignore the voters who voted for the 
opponent—especially in close contests— 
for those same voters may be around in 
the next election to either seek their re­
venge against or to display their support 
for the incumbent.
(3) Political participants realize that 
elections in the American political system 
are not for all time but occur from tune to 
time.
Here Hamilton explains, " . . .  a 
strategy adopted for one election in a 
particular context is not written in stone, 
but is precisely a strategy used at that 
time to maximize the possibility of 
achieving certain goals, and which ought 
to be seen in that very pragmatic, utili­
tarian way.”13
An undercurrent of political pragma­
tism that runs through this strategy is an
acknowledgement on the part of candi­
dates for public office that race and 
racism are facts of American political life. 
These are features that can be exploited 
or strategically side-stepped depending 
on the race of the candidate and the sort 
of advice that he or she receives.
Consider the most recent example of 
an effort involving the exploitation of 
racism. While President George Bush 
denied any open endorsement of the 
“Willie Horton” strategy in the recent
Jesse Jackson’s two tries 
for the Democratic presi­
dential nomination may 
have awakened portions of 
the white electorate . . .
presidential election, certainly his cam­
paign strategist understood the sub­
liminal power of connecting Governor 
Michael Dukakis with a convicted African 
American rapist and with a policy initia­
tive (incorrectly) attributed to Dukakis. 
Thus a strategy on the part of the Bush 
campaign that linked a vote for the 
Democratic presidential candidate with 
the fears of the white electorate aided 
the Republican Party in retaining control 
of the White House in 1988.14
Correspondingly, Jesse Jackon’s cam­
paign for the 1988 Democratic presi­
dential nomination was one in which he 
appeared to deemphasize the sort of is­
sues and symbols that were more appar­
ent in his 1984 campaign. Jackson’s 1988 
campaign was clearly more successful, 
i.e., he got more total votes, especially 
from whites, than was the case in 1984. 
It can be surmised that the 1988 results 
were not only influenced by the 1984 
contest, but during Jacksons 1988 presi­
dential campaign he (and his advisors) 
made a decided effort to appeal to white 
voters, e.g., farmers and blue collar work­
ers, in a way that had not been stressed in 
1984.
Jackson also sought in 1988 to avoid 
the sort of issues that in 1984 were seen 
as a direct challenge to the most ambi­
valent part of the Democratic coalition,
white Southerners, e.g., his 1984 call for 
the leaderhsip of the national Democratic 
Party to dismantle the run-off primary 
system in the South.15
Jackson’s performance in the 1988 
presidential primaries indicates not only 
a greater amount of support among white 
voters, but also suggests that these 
voters found a less racially intimidating 
Jackson in 1988, a possibility that ap­
pears to be linked with Jackson’s compar­
atively deracialized campaign style.16
This shift in campaign style, from a 
more openly racially confrontational one, 
to one that placed greater emphasis on 
issues that transcended race, may not 
have gone unnoticed by many of the Afri­
can American victors in the recently held 
elections.
In New York and Virginia, Dinkins and 
Wilder took a pro-choice stance on the 
abortion issue. This racially transcendent 
position gained support for both candi­
dates from women and pro-choice 
activists.
In Cleveland, White was the only can­
didate with measurable support among 
both African Americans and white voters.
In both Durham and New Haven, bi- 
racial, liberal forces joined to defeat pre­
dominately white, more conservative 
Republican candidates.
Finally, Norman Rice’s opposition to a 
busing referendum apparently did him 
little harm among the white voters in 
Seattle.
While the socioeconomic and demo­
graphic circumstances in these seven 
large cities and the state of Virginia make 
the search for a unifying explanatory 
theme difficult, the fairly consistent per­
sistence of race as a potentially volatile 
issue in American politics suggests that a 
political strategy of deemphasizing racially 
salient issues may explain why this nation 
now has some newly elected African 
American mayors and one newly elected 
African American governor.
Beyond 1989: A New Black Politics?
What do these recent events portend for 
the future? They suggest a number of 
things. Among some white voters in this 
country, African American candidates for 
public office are now seen as less threat­
ening. Notwithstanding his self-congra­
tulatory claim for credit in the Dinkins 
and Wilder victories,1' Jesse Jackson’s 
two tries for the Democratic presidential 
nomination may have awakened portions
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of the white electorate to consider the 
non-racial merits of voting for a candidate 
who happens to be African American. 
Such white voters, it could be argued, 
might have voted for African American 
candidates even if Jackson had not been 
such a dominant player during the 1984 
and 1988 presidential campaigns.
While that is indeed a possibility, 
speculating about such a possibility 
would produce no data from which white 
motives for supporting a candidate could 
be reliably deduced. What is known, 
however, is that most of these victorious 
candidates who ran in areas where Afri­
can Americans did not constitute the 
majority, made appeals to white voters 
that were of a deracialized nature. Suffi­
cient numbers of white voters responded 
to elect these candidates, and the candi­
dates realized the strategic necessity of 
bringing together bi- or multi-racial coali­
tions through the use of an essentially 
deracialized issue agenda.
Will such a strategy continue into the 
future? There is every reason that Afri­
can American candidates for public office 
at the state and local levels will continue 
to pursue this strategy in the future be­
cause it appears to have “worked.”
The cautionary note should be sound­
ed, however, that this political strategy is 
not foolproof. In two of the more cele­
brated contests discussed in this 
article—New York City and Virginia— 
Dinkins and Wilder barely won. Neither 
of these candidates did as well among 
white voters as victorious white candi­
dates had done among African American 
voters in previous elections. White sup­
port for African American candidates, 
therefore, should be regarded as rather 
“soft” perhaps well into the next decade. 
What bears closer attention in the future 
is the nature of the African American 
electorate.
Over the past two decades, in con­
tests against white opponents, African 
American candidates for public office 
have tended to take the African Ameri­
can electorate for granted, i.e., that it 
would give its overwhelming support. 
Given the changing demography of urban 
America, African American incumbents 
are likely to face challenges from other 
African American or Hispanic rivals. The 
widening chasm between the increas­
ingly suburban middle class and the 
urban underclass may lead to the emerg­
ence of new candidates—particularly at
the local level—who seek to improve the 
material conditions of those at the bot­
tom of the socioeconomic order. These 
candidates could articulate a more ra­
cially specific issue agenda noticeably at 
odds with the more deracialized rhetoric 
displayed in the recent elections. Such a 
scenario could lead to more vigorous 
competition for the African American 
vote by these candidates.
Finally there is the matter of what all 
of this portends for the future of the
The victories of Novem­
ber 7, 1989 do not neces­
sarily translate into a 
Democratic return to the 
White House in 1992.
Democratic Party and the 1992 presi­
dential election. Before the 1992 presi­
dential season gets underway there are 
the congressional contests of 1990. 
These contests will provide students of 
American politics with the next oppor­
tunity to gauge the viability and desir­
ability of the political strategy of de- 
racialization.
Until that time, speculation will have 
to be informed on what is presently 
known about the recent past.
The victories of November 7, 1989 do 
not necessarily translate into a Demo­
cratic return to the White House in 1992. 
Only two of the contests examined herein 
took place in the “Old South” where white 
male Democrats have tended not to sup­
port Democratic presidential candidates. 18
Until African American candidates 
running for state and local offices in the 
South are able to generate winning bi- or 
multi-racial support through the use of 
deracialized political strategies, it is any­
one’s guess what the results of Novem­
ber 7, 1989 will hold for 1992. □
Joseph P. McCormick, Ph.D., is an associate pro­
fessor in the Department of Political Science at How­
ard University.
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